REVEALED ALTRUISM by Cox, James et al.
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
1-1-2006 
REVEALED ALTRUISM 
James Cox 
Georgia State University 
Daniel Friedman 
University of California 
VJOLLCA SADIRAJ 
Georgia State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Cox, James; Friedman, Daniel; and SADIRAJ, VJOLLCA, "REVEALED ALTRUISM" (2006). ExCEN Working 
Papers. 132. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/132 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
REVEALED ALTRUISM
BY JAMES C. COX, DANIEL FRIEDMAN, AND VJOLLCA SADIRAJ
Abstract. This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over
ones own and othersmonetary payo¤s. We introduce more altruistic than
(MAT), a partial ordering over preferences, and interpret it with known para-
metric models. We also introduce and illustrate more generous than(MGT),
a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two
player extensive form games of complete information in which the rst mover
(FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity set for the second mover
(SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that anMGT choice
by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion is that
the e¤ect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts
of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences
of these assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in
existing data from investment games and from Stackelberg games and in new
data from Stackelberg mini-games.
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1. Introduction
What are the contents of preferences? People surely care about their own mater-
ial well-being, e.g., as proxied by income. In some contexts people also may care
about otherswell-being. Abstract theory and common sense have long recog-
nized that possibility but until recently it has been neglected in applied work.
Evidence from the laboratory and eld (as surveyed in Fehr and Gächter (2000),
for example) has begun to persuade economists to develop specic models of how
and when a persons preferences depend on othersmaterial payo¤s (Sobel, 2005).
Andreoni and Miller (2002) report dictatorexperiments in which a human
subject decides on an allocation for himself and for some anonymous other subject
while facing a linear budget constraint. Their analysis conrms consistency with
the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) for a large majority of
subjects. They conclude that altruism can be modeled as utility maximizing
behavior.
In this paper we take three further steps down the same path. First, we create
non-linear opportunity sets. Such sets allow the subject to reveal more about the
tradeo¤ between her own and anothers income, e.g., whether her indi¤erence
curves have positive or negative slope, and whether the curvature is zero or
negative. Second, we give another subject an initial move that can be more
or less generous. This allows us to distinguish conditional altruism positive and
negative reciprocity from unconditional altruism. It also allows us to clarify
the observable consequences of convex preferences and of reciprocal preferences.
Third, we distinguish active from passive initial moves; i.e., we distinguish among
acts of omission, acts of commission, and absence of opportunity to act, and
examine their impacts on reciprocity.
We begin in Section 2 by developing representations of preferences over own
and othersincome, and formalize the idea that one preference ordering is more
altruistic than(MAT) another. We include the possibility of negative regard
for the others income; in this case MAT really means less malevolent than.
Special cases include the main parametric models of other regarding preferences
that have appeared in the literature.
0For helpful comments, we thank Steve Gjerstad, Stephen Leider, Stefan Traub, and Joel Sobel
as well as participants in the International Meeting of the Economic Science Association (ESA)
2004, the North American Regional ESA Meeting 2004, and at Economics Department seminars
at UCSC, Harvard and University College London.
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Section 3 introduces opportunities and choices, and illustrates concepts with
several two player games of complete information from the recent literature. Sec-
tion 4 formalizes the idea that one opportunity set is more generous than (MGT)
another, and then uses it to formalize reciprocity. Axiom R asserts that more
generous choices by the rst mover induce more altruistic preferences in the sec-
ond mover. An interpretation urged in a previous paper (Cox, Friedman, and
Gjerstad, forthcoming) is that preferences are emotional state-dependent, and
the rst movers generosity induces a more benevolent (or less malevolent) emo-
tional state in the second mover. Axiom S asserts that the reciprocity e¤ect is
stronger following an act of commission (upsetting the status-quo) than following
an act of omission (upholding the status-quo), and that the e¤ect is weaker when
the rst mover is unable to alter the status quo.
Section 5 reports some general theoretical propositions on the consequences of
convex preferences and Axioms R and S. To illustrate the empirical content, we
derive testable predictions for the well-known investment game, which features
a complete MGT ordering of linear opportunity sets. We also derive testable
predictions for Stackelberg duopoly games. These games are especially useful
because a smaller output by the Stackelberg Leader induces a more generous op-
portunity set for the Follower, and because the opportunity sets have a parabolic
shape that enables the Follower to reveal a wide range of positive and negative
tradeo¤s between own income and Leaders income. Some key predictions involve
a variant game, called the Stackelberg mini-game, in which the Leader has only
two alternative output choices, one of which is clearly more generous than the
other.
The last three sections report tests of the predictions on existing investment
game data, on existing Stackelberg data, and on new Stackeberg mini-game data.
Within the limitations of the data, the test results are consistent with predictions.
All formal proofs and other mathematical details are collected in Appendix A.
Instructions to subjects in the mini-Stackelberg game appear in Appendix B.
2. Preferences
Let Y = (Y1; Y2; :::; YN) 2 RN+ represent the payo¤ vector in a game that pays
each of N  2 players a non-negative income. Admissible preferences for each
player i are smooth and convex orderings on the positive orthant <N+ that are
strictly increasing in own income Yi. The set of all admissible preferences is
denoted P. Any particular preference P 2 P can be represented by a smooth
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utility function u : <N+ ! < with positive ith partial derivative @u@Yi = uYi > 0:
The other rst partial derivatives are zero for standard selsh preferences, but we
allow for the possibility that they are positive in some regions (where the agent
is benevolent) and negative in others (where she is malevolent).
We shall focus on two-player extensive form games of complete information,
and to streamline notation we shall denote own (my) income by Yi = m and
the other players (your) income by Y i = y. Thus preferences are dened on
the positive quadrant <2+ = f(m; y) : m; y  0g: The players marginal rate of
substitution MRS(m; y) = um=uy is, of course, the negative of the slope of the
indi¤erence curve through the given point. Unfortunately, the MRS is not well
dened at points where the agent is selsh, and diverges to +1 and back from
 1 when we pass from slight benevolence to slight malevolence. Therefore it
is convenient to work with willingness to pay, WTP = 1=MRS, the amount of
own income the agent is willing to give up in order to increase the other agents
income by a unit. WTP moves from slightly positive through zero to slightly
negative when the agent goes from slight benevolence to slight malevolence.
What sort of factors might a¤ectWTP? A prime candidate is relative income,
as measured for non-zero allocations in <2+ by the ratio of others income to
own income, d = y=m: It is easily shown (see Appendix A.1) that only relative
income d matters for homothetic preferences, i.e., WTP is constant along each
ray Rd = f(t; td) : t > 0g  <2+ when preferences are homothetic.
It is intuitive that WTP decreases in d, that is, Im willing to pay less to
increase your income when Im relatively poor. The intuition is formalized in the
convexity assumption imposed earlier. Recall that preferences are convex if each
upper contour set (i.e., the set of allocations preferred to any given allocation)
is a convex subset of <2+. A quantitative measure of convexity is provided by
curvature of the indi¤erence curves. In terms of the rst and second partial
derivatives of a utility function u representing the preferences, curvature is
(2.1) K =
ummu
2
y   2umyumuy + uyyu2m
(u2m + u
2
y)
3=2
The convexity assumption is that K  0 at every point <2+.1 Negative K re-
ects decreasingMRS and increasingWTP as a benevolent players own income
1This statement is true since we have chosen to work with outward-pointing normal vectors,
that is the normal vector points outside the upper contour set. When the curve lies on one side
of the tangent line and the normal vector on the other side then the sign of the curvature is
negative.
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increases along an indi¤erence curve. Of course K = 0 in a region where indif-
ference curves are straight lines, and more negative K means that the WTP
changes more quickly with changes in relative income d along an indi¤erence
curve. See Appendix A.2 for a derivation of the formula, and alternate expres-
sions.
Note that bothWTP andK are intrinsic for preferences. That is, if we choose
another utility function v = h  u to represent the same preferences (so h0(t) > 0
8t 2 Range(u)), then using v in the computations forWTP and K gives us the
same values that we get using u.
We are now prepared to formalize the idea that one preference ordering on <2+
is more altruistic than another. Two di¤erent preference orderings A;B 2 P over
income allocation vectors might represent the preferences of two di¤erent players,
or might represent the preferences of the same player in two di¤erent emotional
states (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, forthcoming).
Denition 1. For a given domain D  <2+ we say that A MAT B on D if
WTPA(m; y) WTPB(m; y); for all (m; y) 2 D.
The idea is straightforward. In the benevolence case (where utility is monotone
increasing in y) more altruistic than (MAT) means that A has shallower indif-
ference curves than B in (m; y) space, so A indicates a willingness to pay more
m than B for a unit increase in y. In the malevolence case,WTP is less negative
for A, so it indicates a lesser willingness to pay for a unit decrease in y.
Of course, MAT is a partial ordering on P (see Appendix A.3), not a total
ordering for nontrivial domains D that contain more than a single point.2 When
preferences are homothetic then it su¢ ces to check for MAT on a thin subset
of D, typically a single indi¤erence curve. When no particular domain D is
indicated, theMAT ordering is understood to refer to the entire positive orthant
D = <2+.
Example 2.1. Linear Inequality-averse Preferences (for N = 2 only; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). Let preferences J = A;B be represented by uJ (m; y) = (1 +
J )m  J y; where
J = J ; if m < y
=  J ; if m  y;
with J  J and 0 < J < 1. Straightforwardly, A MAT B i¤ A  B.
2The single crossing property imposes the same partial ordering in a di¤erent context, but it is
usually restricted to one-dimensional families of preferences.
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Example 2.2. Nonlinear Inequality-averse Preferences (for N = 2; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000). Let preferences J = A;B be represented by uJ (m; y) =
J (m;); where
 = m=(m+ y); if m+ y > 0
= 1=2; if m+ y = 0
It can be easily veried that A MAT B i¤ A1=A2  B1=B2.
Example 2.3. Quasi-maximin Preferences (for N = 2; Charness and Rabin,
2002). Let preferences J = A;B be represented by
uJ (m; y) = m+ J (1  J )y; if m < y;
= (1  J J )m+ J y; if m  y
and J 2 [0; 1], J 2 (0; 1). It is straightforward (although a bit tedious) to
verify that A MAT B i¤
A  Bmax

1
1 + (A   B)B
;
1  B
1  A

:
Example 2.4. Egocentric Altruism (CES) Preferences (Cox and Sadiraj, 2004).
Let preferences J=A;B be represented by
uJ (m; y) =
1

(m + J y); if  2 ( 1; 1)f0g
= myJ ; if  = 0:
If 0 < B  A then A MAT B. Verication is straightforward: WTPJ =
J (m=y)1 , J = A;B imply WPTA=WTPB = A=B  1: Egocentricity
means that uJ (x + ; x   ) > uJ (x   ; x + ) for any  2 (0; x) which implies
WTP(m;m)  1:
The exponent   1 in the last example determines the curvature and hence
the convexity of preferences. Straightforward algebra yields
K =
(  1)m+1y+1(m + y)
((my)2 + (my)2)
3
2
 0:
On a ray Rd = f(m;md) : m > 0g we have
K =
(  1)d+1(d + 1)
m(d2 + (d)2)
3
2
 0:
Thus the curvature decreases (in absolute value) along a given ray proportionally
to 1=m, i.e., mK is constant along the ray. Appendix A.4 shows that the same
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is true for any homothetic preferences. Hence relative curvature mK sometimes
is more useful than curvature K:
Much of the theoretical literature on social preferences relies on special assump-
tions that appear to be inconsistent with the classical approach to preference (and
demand) theory (Hicks, 1939; Samuelson, 1947). The preceding examples help
to clarify the issues. The linear and nonlinear inequality aversion models, quasi-
maximin model, and egocentric altruism all assume convex preferences, since
their upper contour sets are all convex. Monotonicity is violated by strict in-
equality aversion: WTP is positive when y is below own income m, butWTP
is negative in the region where y > m. For N = 2, the maximin property is
implied by convexity and positive monotonicity, and therefore is a property of
altruistic preferences with these classical properties. A preference for e¢ ciency
(i.e., for a larger total of all agentspayo¤s) is consistent with a limiting case of
the quasi-maximin model. In our notation, e¢ ciency is implied by preferences
withWTP=1. We shall now see that for more general preferences, the e¢ ciency
of choices depends on the shape of the opportunity set.
3. Opportunities
Dene an opportunity set F (or synonymously, a feasible set or budget set)
as a convex compact subset of <2+: It is convenient and harmless (given prefer-
ences monotone in own income m) to assume free disposal for own income, i.e.,
if (m; y) 2 F then (am; y) 2 F for all a 2 [0; 1]. Every opportunity set F is
closed (as a compact set in <2+) and therefore it contains its <2+-boundary, de-
noted @F ; indeed F is the convex hull of @F . Convexity of F means that each
boundary point has a supporting hyperplane (i.e., tangent line) dened by an
inward-pointing normal vector, and F is contained in a closed positive halfspace;
see for example Rockafellar, 1970, p. 100. At some boundary points X (infor-
mally called corners or kinks) the supporting hyperplane is not unique; examples
will be noted later.
At regular boundary points there is a unique supporting hyperplane and the
implicit function theorem guarantees a smooth function f whose zero isoquant
denes the boundary locally. The marginal rate of transformationMRT can be
expressed as a ratio of the rst partial derivatives, except when the tangent is
vertical. We often need to work near vertical tangents, so we use the need to pay,
NTP, dened as NTP(X) = 1=MRT(X) = fy=fm. The NTP is single-valued
except at kinks and corners of the boundary, where its values lie in some interval.
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Curvature can also be dened at regular boundary points, using the same
formula 2.1 for K with u replaced by f . Again K and NTP are intrinsic, inde-
pendent of the choice f used to represent the boundary segment.
Some examples may help x ideas.
Example 3.1. Standard budget set. Let F =

(m; y) 2 <2+ : m+ py  I
	
for
given p; I > 0. Then @F consists of portions of the axes together with the line
segment

(m; y) 2 <2+ : m+ py = I
	
, as shown in Figure 1. The NTP is p along
the budget line, is 0 along the y axis and is 1 along the m-axis. NTP assumes
all values outside the interval (0; p) at the corner (0; I=p), and takes all values in
the interval [ 1; p] at the corner (I; 0) 2 @F . As usual, curvature is not dened
at the corners, while at all regular boundary points K = 0.
Example 3.2. Ring test (Liebrand, 1984; see also Sonnemans, van Dijk and
van Winden, 2005). Let F =

(m; y) 2 <2+ : m2 + y2  R2
	
for given R > 0, as
shown in Figure 2.3 On the circular part of the boundary, NTP is y=m and the
curvature is 1=R:
Example 3.3. Ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982).
The responders opportunities in the $10 ultimatum game consist of the origin
(0; 0) and (due to our free disposal assumption) the horizontal line segment from
(0; 10   x) to (x; 10   x). This set is not convex so it doesnt qualify as an
opportunity set by our denition. Its convex hull, however, is the opportunity
set in the Convex Ultimatum game (Andreoni, Castillo and Petrie, 2003), which
is identical to that of the Power to Take game in the following example.
Example 3.4. Power to take game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). The take
authorityplayer chooses a take rate b 2 [0; 1]. Then the responder with income
I chooses a destruction rate 1   . The resulting payo¤s are m = (1   b)I for
the responder and y = bI for the take authority. Thus, with free disposal the re-
sponders opportunity set is the convex hull of three points (m; y) = (0; 0); (0; bI)
and ((1  b)I; bI): Along the Eastern boundary NTP is constant at (b 1)=b and
the curvature is 0: Figure 3 shows opportunity sets for b = 0:3; 0:7 and I = 10.
Example 3.5. Investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995). The First
Mover (FM) and Second Mover (SM) each have an initial endowment of I. The
FM sends an amount s 2 [0; I] to SM, who receives ks. Then the SM returns
an amount r 2 [0; ks] to the FM, resulting in payo¤s m = I + ks   r for SM
3In the original studies @F is the entire circle

(m; y) 2 <2 : m2 + y2 = R2	, not just the portion
in the positive quadrant.
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and y = I   s+ r for FM. The FMs choice of s selects the SMs opportunity set
Fs =

(m; y) 2 <2+ : y 2 [I   s; I + (k   1)s];m 2 [0; 2I + (k   1)s  y]
	
. Cur-
vature K = 0 on each segment of the boundary, and NTP = 1 on the segment
of the boundary corresponding to m+ y = 2I + (k   1)s. Figure 4 shows Fs for
s = 3 and 9 when I = 10 and k = 3.
Example 3.6. Moonlighting game (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2000). In
this variant on the investment game, the FM sends s 2 [ I=2; I] to SM, who
receives g(s) = ks for positive s and g(s) = s for negative s. Then the second
mover transfers t 2 [( I + s)=k; I + g(s)] resulting in non-negative payo¤s m =
I + g(s)   jtj and y = I   s + t for positive t and y = I   s + kt for negative
t: The second movers opportunity set is the convex hull of the points (m; y) =
(0; 0); (I + g(s)   (I   s)=k; 0); (I + g(s); I   s); and (0; 2I + g(s)   jsj). The
NTP along the boundary of the opportunity set is 1 above and  1=k below the
t = 0 locus, is 0 along the y axis, and is 1 along the m-axis. Again, curvature
at all regular boundary points is K = 0. Figure 5 shows SM opportunity sets
for s =  5 and 4 when I = 10 and k = 3:
Example 3.7. Gift exchange labor markets (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993).
The employer with initial endowment I o¤ers a wage w 2 [0; I] and the worker
then chooses an e¤ort level e 2 [0; 1] with a quadratic cost function c(e). The nal
payo¤s arem = w c(e) for the worker and y = I+ke w for the employer, where
the productivity parameter k = 10 in a typical game. Figure 6 shows opportunity
sets for w = 3; 7 and I = 10; c(e) = 10e2: The workers opportunity set is similar
to the second movers in the investment game, except that the Northeastern
boundary is a parabolic arc instead of a straight line of slope  1. Along this
Eastern boundary NTP is 2e and the curvature is  1=5(4e2 + 1)3=2: Also, if the
employer o¤ers a wage in excess of his endowment I then the opportunity set
includes part of the quadrant [m > 0 > y]. It is straightforward but a bit messy
to extend the denition of opportunity set to include such possibilities.
Example 3.8. Sequential VCM public good game with two players (Varian,
1994). Each player has initial endowment I. FM contributes c1 2 [0; I] to
the public good. SM observes c1 and then chooses his contribution c2 2 [0; I].
Each unit contributed has a return of a 2 (0:5; 1], so the nal payo¤s are m =
I + ac1  (1  a)c2 for SM and y = I + ac2  (1  a)c1 for FM. SMs opportunity
set is the convex hull of the four points (m; y) = (0; I   (1  a)c1); (I + ac1; I  
(1  a)c1); (aI + ac1; (1+ a)I   (1  a)c1) and (0; (1+ a)I   (1  a)c1): Along the
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Pareto frontier, NTP is constant at (1   a)=a: Figure 7 shows opportunity sets
for c1 = 2; 8 and I = 10; a = 0:75.
Example 3.9. Stackelberg duopoly game (e.g., Varian, 1992, p. 295-298). Con-
sider a duopoly with zero xed cost, constant and equal marginal cost, and non-
trivial linear demand. Without further loss of generality one can normalize so
that the prot margin (price minus marginal cost) is M = T   q
L
  q
F
, where
q
L
2 [0; T ] is the Leaders output choice and q
F
2 [0; T   q
L
] is the Followers
output to be chosen. Thus payo¤s are m = Mq
F
and y = Mq
L
: The Followers
opportunity set therefore is bounded by a parabolic arc opening towards the y-
axis, as shown in Figure 8 for T = 24 and q
L
= 6; 8 and 11. A calculation of
NTP and curvature appears in Appendix A.5. Unlike the earlier examples, the
NTP varies smoothly from negative to positive values along the boundary of the
opportunity set as one moves counterclockwise.
4. Reciprocity
Reciprocity is key to our analysis. The idea is that more generous choices by
one player induce more altruistic preferences in a second player. To formalize,
consider a two person extensive form game of complete information in which the
rst mover (FM) chooses an opportunity set C 2 C, and the second mover (SM)
chooses the payo¤ vector (m; y) 2 C. It is natural to regard opportunity set G
as more generous than (MGT) opportunity set F if it is obtained by stretching
along them axis (SMs potential payo¤s), and shrinking (or stretching less) along
the y axis (FMs potential payo¤s).
Denition 2. Opportunity set G  <2+ is more generous than opportunity set F
if G = TF for some smooth transformation T : <2+  ! <2+ such that (m; y) 7 !
((m); #(y)) with (0)  0; 0(z)  1 and (z)  #(z) for all z  0: In this case
we write G MGT F:
Initially, the second mover knows the collection C of possible opportunity sets.
Prior to her actual choice she learns the actual opportunity set C 2 C; and
acquires preferences AC . Reciprocity is captured formally in
Axiom R: Let the rst mover choose the actual opportunity set for the
second mover from the collection C. If F;G 2 C and G MGT F , then
AG MAT AF .
There is a traditional distinction between sins of commission (active choice)
and sins of omission (retaining the status quo). Of course, sometimes there is no
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choice at all and the status quo cannot be altered. Intuitively, the second mover
will respond more strongly to generous (or ungenerous) choices that overturn the
status quo than to those that uphold it, or that involve no real choice by the
rst mover.4 Compared to no choice, upholding the status quo should provoke
the stronger response, at least when the status quo is the best or worst possible
opportunity.
The following notation will help formalize the intuition. Let the rst mover
choose the actual opportunity set C from a collection C. If C contains at least
two elements, then one of them is denoted the status quo. Let AC and ACc
respectively denote the second movers acquired preferences when C is the status
quo and when it di¤ers from the status quo. If C is a singleton, then the rst
mover has no choice and we write C = fCog with corresponding second mover
preferences ACo .
Axiom S: Let the rst mover choose the actual opportunity set for the
second mover from the collection C. If the status quo is either F or G
and G MGT F then
(1) AGc MAT AG ;AGo and AF  ; AF o MAT AF c ;
(2) AG MAT AGo if G MGT C; for all C 2 C and AF o MAT AF  if C
MGT F for all C 2 C:
We will say that either Axiom holds strictly if the inequality in the MAT
Denition 1 is strict.
It should be emphasized that the recent preference models noted in Examples
2.1 - 2.4 have no room for Axioms R and S. In those models preferences are
assumed xed, una¤ected by more or less generous opportunity sets chosen by
the rst mover. Actual choices by a rst mover are not central even in the "reci-
procity" models of Charness and Rabin (2002, Appendix), Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Those models focus on higher-
order beliefs regarding other playersintentions (or, in Levine (1998), regarding
other playerstypes). Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (forthcoming) implicitly con-
sider Axiom R, but only within the particular parametric family of CES utility
functions noted in Example 2.4.
Natural MGT orderings are fairly common. For example, with the standard
budget set in Example 3.1, an increase in own income I or a real increase in
the price of transfers (so I=p decreases) leads to a more generous budget set, as
illustrated by the solid budget lines in Figure 9. Indeed, 0 > 1 is simply the
4This intuition goes back at least to Adam Smiths Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759, p. 181.
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income ratio and #0 < 1 reects the decrease in I=p. Likewise, it is clear from
Figures 3-8 that smaller take rate  in the Power to Take game, larger s in the
Investment and Moonlighting games, larger I in the Gift Exchange Labor Market,
a larger contribution c1 in the VCM public goods game and a smaller output qL
in the Stackelebrg duopoly game all create MGT opportunities for the second
mover (Appendix A.7 veries this for the Investment game and the Stackelberg
duopoly game.)
But a few minutes study of those gures reveals that reciprocity and convexity
will be di¢ cult to disentangle. In the Investment game, for example, larger
s moves the second movers altered endowment down along the dashed line in
Figure 4, increasing his relative income. Indeed, the ray through the altered
endowment point for s = 3 has slope d = 7=19, compared to d = 1=37 for s = 9:
Hence if the second movers preferences are strictly convex and homothetic then
a larger s implies greater WTP at the altered endowment even when those
preferences are not at all a¤ected by the rst movers more generous choice. The
other games also conate convexity and reciprocity. The underlying problem
is that more generous choices by denition create better relative opportunities,
hence lower d and (by convexity) greaterWTP.
5. Choice
As in standard preference theory, our maintained assumption is that every
player always chooses a most preferred point in the opportunity set F . By posi-
tive monotonicity in own income such points are from @F; and by convexity such
points must form a connected subset of @F: If either preferences A or opportu-
nities F are strictly convex then that subset is a singleton, i.e., there is a unique
choice X 2 @F . In this case all points in F n fXg are revealed to be on lower
A-indi¤erence curves than X.
Not all boundary points are candidates for choice in our set up. The rst result
is that, due to strict monotonicity in own payo¤ m, only easternpoints will
be chosen, since they have larger own payo¤. To formalize, dene the Eastern
boundary as @EF = f(m; y) 2 F : 8x > m; (x; y) =2 Fg. The North point NF
and the South point SF are the points in @EF with respectively the largest and
the smallest y component.
Proposition 1. Suppose that either preferences A or the opportunity set F are
strictly convex, and let X be the A chosen point in F: Then X 2 @EF .
All proofs are collected in Appendix A.
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The next result shows that, as admissible preferences go frommaximally malev-
olent through neutral to maximally benevolent under the MAT ordering, the
players choices trace out the Eastern boundary of the budget set from South to
North. To put it another way, consider the ray of slope d. As d increases from 0
to1, the intersection of the ray with the Eastern boundary traces out the chosen
points. The notation dX indicates the slope of the ray through X, i.e., dX = y=m
if X = (m; y).
Proposition 2. Suppose that either preferences A and B, or the opportunity set
F , are strictly convex. Let XA and XB be the points in F n f(0; 0)g chosen when
preferences are respectively A and B. Then
(1) B MAT A implies dXB  dXA for homothetic preferences.
(2) If X 2 @EF lies on a ray with slope between dXA and dXB , then there
are preferences P with B MAT P MAT A such that X is the P-chosen
point in F:
(3) There are admissible preferences for which the chosen point is arbitrarily
close to SF , and other admissible preferences for which the chosen point
is arbitrarily close to NF .
Propositions 1 and 2 deal with a xed opportunity set. Often we need predic-
tions of how an agent with given preferences will choose in a new opportunity set.
Textbook preference theory o¤ers such predictions in the case of standard budget
sets and convex monotone preferences. We will get weaker predictions because we
deal with more general opportunity sets and with preferences that are convex but
not necessarily monotone in others income y. The following example illustrates
this.
Example 5.1. Figure 9 shows standard budget sets F with I = 1; p = 1 (solid
line) and G with I = 2; p = 4 (dashed line). Suppose that a player with prefer-
ences P picks X from F . What can we predict about his choice W from G? If it
happens that X is in G then textbook preference theory tells us that W is not
in F ; it must be on the segment of the G budget line that lies outside F . Us-
ing homotheticity, we can strengthen the prediction: W lies on the sub-segment
between Y = tX and the South point SG, which is (2; 0), as indicated in the
gure.
The result in Example 5.1 generalizes to nonlinear convex opportunity sets, as
shown by the following proposition and illustrated in Figure 10. The proposition
constructs a point Z which solves NTP@F (X) = NTP@G(Z). The Appendix
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shows how to extend the denition so that Z is well dened even with corners
and kinks at which NTP is not single valued.
Proposition 3. Let an agent with strictly convex and homothetic preferences A
choose X and W respectively from some opportunity sets F and G. Let Y = tX
be the most distant point from the origin on the ray through X in @EG, and let
Z 2 @EG solve NTP@F (X) = NTP@G(Z). Then
(1) if X 2 G then W 2 F c or W = X;
(2) dW  minfdX ; dNGg i¤ NTP@F (X)  NTP@G(Y ), and
(3) dW  dZ i¤ dZ  dX .
Figure 9 makes it transparent that statement (1) in the proposition is equivalent
to the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference for standard budget sets dened by
price vectors pG and pF : if pG W  pG X (i.e. X 2 G) then pF W > pF X
(i.e. W 2 FC) or W = X: Statements (1) - (3) extend these traditional ideas
to convex opportunity sets with nonlinear boundaries in the case of homothetic
preferences, as shown in Figure 10.5
Propositions 1-3 do not invoke Axioms R and S. These axioms sometimes
sharpen and sometimes weaken the predictions of standard preference theory, as
illustrated in the rest of this section.
Example 5.2. What happens in example 5.1 if preferences A are altered by the
choice of G over F? Were G less generous than F , then reciprocity assumption R
would imply that the choice W would shift southward, towards the corner (2; 0)
of the budget set, i.e., the earlier prediction would hold a fortiori. However, G
MGT F for reasons explained in the second to last paragraph of the previous
section. Consequently, Axiom R implies that W will shift northward. The pre-
diction reduces to saying that W is north of the South corner. But this tells us
nothing; no choice along the Eastern portion of @G is ruled out. The problem
here is that the reciprocity e¤ect doesnt reinforce the usual substitution e¤ect
in preference theory, but rather counteracts it and we have no indication which
e¤ect is stronger.
Sharper results often arise from closer examination of specic games. We il-
lustrate by deriving testable predictions for the Investment game of Example
3.5.
5For convex opportunity sets, Matzkin (1991) derives revealed preference inequalities in terms
of the supporting hyperplanes. For more general opportunity sets, Forges and Minelli (2006)
derive revealed preferences that are not necessarily convex.
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Proposition 4. Let the FM in the Investment game choose Fs as the SMs op-
portunity set, and let r(s) be the SMs response. Also let the same SM be given
the same opportunity set Fs in a dictator game, and let ro(s) be his response
there. Assume thatWTP  1 and @WTP=@m  0: Then:
(1) convexity implies that ro(s) is increasing in s;
(2) Axiom R implies that r(s) is increasing in s;
(3) Axiom S implies that r(s)  ro(s) for all feasible s:
The assumption WTP  1 says that the Follower would not favor an ine¢ -
cient adverse transfer; at the margin he loves his neighbor no more than himself.
The assumption @WTP=@m  0 simply says that the Follower becomes no less
generous when her income increases, other things equal.
The standard Stackelberg game in Example 3.9 is especially useful for our
purposes. Figure 8 suggests (and Appendix A.7 veries) that smaller output
choices by the Stackelberg Leader createMGT opportunity sets for the Follower.
By AxiomR we expect this to induceMAT preferences in the Follower. It seems
that this preference shift should induce the Follower to choose smaller output.
But of course we must also take into account preference convexity, and also the
changing curvature of the opportunity set. The next proposition sorts out these
e¤ects and expresses them in terms of the Followers deviation from selsh best
reply.
Proposition 5. In the standard Stackelberg game of Example 3.9 let QD(qL) =
qF   qoF be the deviation of the Followers output choice qF from the selsh best
reply qoF = 12  12qL when the Leader chooses output qL. One has
dQD
dqL
=  1
2
w   dw
dqL
qL
where w =WTP(MqF ;MqL) is willingness to pay at the chosen point. Further-
more,
(1) If Followers preferences A are xed and linear, then w is constant with
respect to qL and
dQD
dqL
is positive if and only if preferences at the chosen
point are malevolent.
(2) If Followers preferences A are xed and convex, then w is decreasing
in qL and
dQD
dqL
contains an additional term that is positive provided that
qL  12, w  1, wm  0 and wm + wy  0.
(3) If Followers preferences satisfy Axiom R strictly, then w is decreasing in
qL and
dQrD
dqL
contains an additional positive term.
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(4) If Followers preferences satisfy Axiom S strictly, thenWTP is decreasing
in qL and
dQsD
dqL
has an additional positive (negative) term if the status quo
is smaller (larger) than qL:
Proposition 5 shows that an increase in qL has three di¤erent e¤ects:
- A reciprocity e¤ect, items (3) - (4) in the Proposition. If Axiom R holds
strictly, then the less generous opportunity set decreases the Followers WTP,
increasing qF and qD. Axiom S moderates or intensies this e¤ect, depending on
the status quo.
- A preference convexity (or substitution) e¤ect, item (2) in the Proposition.
The choice point is pushed northwest, where (subject to some technical quali-
cations)WTP is less, again increasing qF and qD.
- An opportunity set shape e¤ect (in some ways analagous to an income e¤ect),
item (1). The curvature of the parabola decreases. Holding w =WTP constant,
qD increases when the Follower is malevolent (w < 0, hence qD > 0), and decreases
when the Follower is benevolent (w > 0, hence qD < 0).
The technical qualications for the preference convexity e¤ect are not especially
restrictive. In a sense, Leader choices qL exceeding the monopoly (and standard
Stackelberg) level 12 are dominated: they produce choice sets for the Follower
that are strict subsets of those produced by qL  12. The mild conditions w 
1 and wm  0 were used in the previous Proposition. Finally, the condition
wm+wy  0 says that equal increases in income do not push preferences towards
malevolence.
A parametric example may clarify the logic. For given qL 2 [0; 24], the
Followers choice set is the parabola f(m; y) : m = MqF ; y = MqL;M =
24  qL  qF ; qF 2 [0; 24  qL]g, with NTP =  dm=dqFdy=dqF =
24 qL 2qF
qL
: Suppose that
the Follower has xed Cobb-Douglas preferences represented by u(m; y) = my,
soWTP is m=y = qF=qL. SolvingNTP =WTP, one obtains qF = Q(qLj) =
(24  qL)=(2 + ): Noting that the selsh best reply is qoF = Q(qLj0); one obtains
a closed form expression for the deviation, qD =   4+2 (24   qL). For xed 
positive (benevolent preferences) or smaller than  2 (pathologically malevolent
preferences), the deviation is negative but increasing in the Leaders output; the
opposite is true when  is negative but larger than  2 (moderately malevolent).
This is the combined impact of the convexity (or substitution) and shape (or
income) e¤ects noted above. Of course, reciprocity e¤ects will decrease  and
hence increase qD.
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A direct way to test for reciprocity is to manipulate the rst movers choice
collection C in the laboratory so that a xed opportunity set is more or less
generous. For example, suppose restrictions on the Stackelberg Leaders choice
set make a given output choice q the most generous (smallest) possible in one
situation, and the same output q the least generous (largest) possible in another
situation. If a given Follower reacts di¤erently in the two situations, it must be
due to reciprocity e¤ects, since by holding q constant we have eliminated the
convexity and shape e¤ects. This is the idea behind the Stackelberg mini-game
introduced in the last empirical section.
Corollary 1. Stackelberg Mini-Game. For 0 < x < s < z < 24; suppose the
Stackelberg Leader has restricted output choices q
L
2 fx; sg in situation (a) and
q
L
2 fz; sg in another situation (b). Let the Leader choose s in both situations.
If Followers preferences satisfy Axioms R and S then QaD(s)  QbD(s); and at
each possible Follower choice qF ; WTPa(MqF ;Ms) WTPb(MqF ;Ms):
6. Investment Game Data
We begin illustration of empirical applications with the Investment game of
Example 3.5. Using a double-blind protocol, Cox (2004) gathers data from a
one-shot investment game (Treatment A) with 32 pairs of FMs and SMs. Cox
also reports parallel data (Treatment C) with another 32 pairs in which SMs
are "dictators" with exactly the same opportunity sets given to them by the
experimenter. In both treatments, the choices s and r are restricted to integer
values but the conclusions of Proposition 4 still hold. Axiom S immediately
implies that a SM with any particular Fs would have more altruistic preferences
and hence would return more in Treatment A than in Treatment C, as noted in
part (3) of Proposition 4. The rst two parts of the proposition predict that the
SM will return more to the FM when s is larger in both treatments.
To test these predictions, construct the dummy variable D = 1 for Treatment
C data, so D = 0 for Treatment A data. Regress the SM choice r on the amount
sent s and its interaction with D, using the 2-sided Tobit procedure to account
for the limited range of SM choices in the 54 relevant observations (r 2 [0; 3s]).6
The estimated coe¢ cient for s is 0:58 ( standard error of 0:22) with one-sided
p-value of 0.006, consistent with reciprocity and part (2) of Proposition 4. The
6The ve observations for each treatment in which s = 0 are not used in the estimation for two
reasons: (a) since the SM opportunity set is a singleton, there is nothing for a theory about
SM choices to explain; and (b) since the left (r = 0) and right (r = 3s) censors in the Tobit
estimation are equal, the estimation algorithm would not be well dened.
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estimated coe¢ cient for D  s is  0:69 (0:32, p = 0:018), consistent with
Axiom S and part (3) of Proposition 4. Since the coe¢ cient sum is statistically
indistinguishable from 0, the convexity prediction in part (1) of Proposition 4 is
neither supported nor contradicted.
We conrm the Axiom S result by direct hypothesis tests on the most relevant
subset of data, where s = 5 (with 7 observations in each treatment) and s = 10
(with 13 observations in each treatment). The Mann-Whitney and t-test both
reject the null hypothesis of no di¤erence between the amounts returned in favor
of the strict Axiom S alternative hypothesis that returns are larger in Treatment
A. The one-sided p-values for the t-test (respectively the Mann-Whitney test)
are 0:027(0:058) for the s = 5 data and are 0:04(0:10) for the s = 10 data.
7. Stackelberg Duopoly Data
The investment game data are consistent with the theory but they do not
permit crisp tests of reciprocity because, among other limitations, (a) the oppor-
tunity sets are linear and hence cant reveal much aboutWTP, and (b) only one
choice is observed per subject, precluding direct observation of changed prefer-
ences. Limitations (a) and (b) are overcome in the Stackelberg duopoly data of
Huck, Müller, and Normann (2001, henceforth HMN).
The HMN data consist of 220 output choices (qL; qF ) by 22 FMs (or Leaders)
choosing qL 2 f3; 4; 5; : : : ; 15g randomly rematched for 10 periods each with 22
SMs (or Followers). As noted in Example 3.9 and elsewhere, the SMs choice qF 2
f3; 4; 5; : : : ; 15g determines payo¤s (m; y) within an opportunity set of discrete
points on a parabolic arc. Specically, payo¤s are m = M qF and y = M qL,
where M = 24   qL   qF is the prot margin. The WTP can be inferred at a
chosen point (qL; qF ) by the NTP at that point, (24  2qF   qL)=qL.
Recall that Proposition 5 predicts that the SMs output choice reveals a con-
stantWTP if her preferences are linear and una¤ected by the FMs output choice
qL. The corresponding deviation QD from her selsh best reply output is linearly
decreasing in qL if her preferences are benevolent. Convexity and AxiomR e¤ects
produce a revealedWTP that is decreasing (and QD that is increasing) in qL.
Table 1 reports tests of these predictions on the HMN data, omitting the 26
data points where the Propositions hypothesis qL  12 fails.7 To check for
asymmetric responses to large and small FM choices (relative to the Cournot
choice qL = 8), we dene the dummy variable DP = 1 if qL  8. All columns
7The results are substantially unchanged when the data points for qL > 12 are included.
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in the Table report panel regressions with individual subject xed e¤ects. The
rst column, with dependent variableWTP 100, rmly rejects the hypothesis
of benevolent linear and xed preferences: the coe¢ cient for qL is signicantly
negative, not positive. The second column, with dependent variable QD, con-
rms this result. We infer that QD is an increasing function of FM output qL,
consistent with convexity and reciprocity. The last column reports that there is
a stronger response to "greedy" FM choices in excess of the Cournot output 8
than to "generous" FM choices below or equal to output 8. Some supplementary
regressions are noted in the Appendix, also consistent with Proposition 5.
Dep:V ariable WTP 100 QD QD
qL  5:43 1:110:000 0:35 0:060:000 0:24 0:080:002
DP  qL  0:10 0:050:023
constant 28:87 11:010:005  2:13 0:580:000  0:81 0:870:176
Table 1. Panel Regressions with xed e¤ects. Data consist of
194 choices by 22 Followers in HMN experiment when qL < 13:
The coe¢ cient point estimates are shown  the standard error,
with one-sided p-values in superscripts.
8. Stackelberg Mini-Game Data
The HMN data still do not permit tests of some of our most distinctive predic-
tions. All FMs (Leaders) have the same choice set, eliminating variability that
could help separate the convexity e¤ect from the reciprocity e¤ect. Also, due in
part to di¤ering experiences, SMs may have di¤erent views on the generosity of
a given output choice qL. In order to overcome these limitations while preserving
the nice quadratic shape of the SM choice sets, we created a new version of the
Stackelberg game that restricts FMs to binary choices.
In our Stackelberg mini-game, each subject in the FM role twice chooses qL 2
f6; 9g and twice chooses qL 2 f9; 12g without feedback. Each subject in the SM
role is then paired simultaneously with four di¤erent FMs and chooses an integer
value of qF 2 f5; 6; :::; 11g with no feedback. The corresponding payo¤s (m; y)
are clearly displayed. The nal payo¤ is given by one of the four choices, selected
randomly at the end of the session. The double blindprocedures are detailed
in the instructions to subjects, reproduced in Appendix B.
Figure 11 summarizes the data. More generous (smaller) choices by the FM
seem to be associated with more altruistic or less malevolent (smaller) choices
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by the SM, but it is hard to tell from the gure whether the e¤ect is signicant.
For example, there are only ve observations at qL = 6. Most importantly, the
scatterplot doesnt show which of the 24 subjects made which choices.
To infer how individual subjects respond to reciprocity concerns, we turn again
to panel regressions with individual subject xed e¤ects. The second column in
Table 2 reports that, consistent with Corollary 1, SMsaverageWTP decreased
by almost 8 cents per dollar when qL = 9 was the less generous choice (indicated
by D9 = 1). The second column reports the same data in a di¤erent way: SM
output choice increased by 0:34 on average, signicant at the p = 0.016 level
(one-sided). Since the opportunity set F9 is constant in these 72 data points, the
result cannot be due to convexity or shape e¤ects; it must be pure reciprocity.
The last column of Table 2 reports regressions for QD for the entire data set,
using the additional dummy variable D12, which takes value 1 if qL = 12; and
0 otherwise:8 The signs of all coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with Axiom R
and convexity.
WTP100
(qL= 9)
QD
(qL= 9)
QD
nobs(gr) 72(24) 72(24) 91(24)
D9  7:65 3:050:008 0:34 0:140:008 0:32 0:140:013
D12 0:37 0:190:028
constant  5:93 2:310:007 0:27 0:100:007 0:19 0:110:046
Table 2. Panel Regressions with xed e¤ects for Stackelberg mini-
game data. Entries are coe¢ cient estimates  standard errors with
one-sided p-values in superscripts.
9. Discussion
Classic choice theory (e.g., Hicks, 1939; Samuelson, 1947) claried and unied
earlier work on how preferences and opportunities a¤ect outcomes. The present
paper applies those classic ideas to social preferences. We focus on willingness
to pay (WTP), the reciprocal of the marginal rate of substitution between own
income and others income. Increasing WTP along indi¤erence curves is sim-
ply convexity, and convex social preferences provide a unied account of several
8We omit here a dummy variable that takes value 1 for qL = 6 because there are only ve such
observations. When the dummy is included, the coe¢ cient estimate has the predicted sign but
of course is insignicant statistically, while the other coe¢ cient estimates change only slightly.
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social motives previously considered separately, such as e¢ ciency, maximin, and
inequality aversion.
The same classic ideas also permit a unied denition of reciprocity. We say
that one set of preferences is more altruistic than (MAT) another if it has a larger
WTP at every point. We formalize reciprocity as a MAT-shift in preferences
following more generous behavior by others. The denitions apply to malevolent
(WTP < 0) as well as benevolent (WTP > 0) preferences, and automatically
combine positive and negative reciprocity.
Convexity and reciprocity are quite di¤erent formally and conceptually, but we
show that empirical work has a natural tendency to confound the two notions.
The problem is simply that more generous behavior by a rst mover tends to
push the second movers opportunities southeast, towards larger income for
the rst mover and smaller income for the second mover. Convexity typically
implies greaterWTP as one pushes southeast, even when there is noMAT-shift
in preferences due to reciprocity.
Several theoretical propositions develop the observable consequences of con-
vexity and reciprocity. We show that more northerly choices on the Eastern
boundary of an opportunity set reveal more altruistic (or less malevolent) pref-
erences. For xed preferences, choices in an opportunity set reveal bounds on
preferences that we translate into bounds on choices in new opportunity sets.
With standard budget sets, these bounds are equivalent to the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference, and sharper versions are derived for homothetic preferences.
In the context of the well-known Investment and Stackelberg duopoly games, the
last two theoretical propositions relate the testable implications of traditional
convex preferences to our formalization of reciprocity and status.
Finally, to illustrate the empirical content of the theory, we examine two exist-
ing data sets and one new data set. Existing investment game data are consistent
with convexity and reciprocity, and conrm that people respond more strongly
to acts of commission than to default choices. Existing Stackelberg data conrm
reciprocity/convexity e¤ects and suggest a stronger negative response to greedy
behavior than the positive response to generous behavior. The new Stackelberg
mini-game data allow us to separate convexity from reciprocity e¤ects, and con-
rm that reciprocity has a signicant impact.
Theoretical clarication sets the stage for further empirical work. One can
now rene earlier empirical studies that examine altruism and reciprocity. Such
work should shed light on the extent to which typical human preferences depart
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from selshness, and to what extent they are altered by experiencing generous or
selsh behavior.
Further theoretical work is also in order. Other denitions of the more gener-
ous thanrelation should be considered and examined empirically. Also, Axiom
S invokes the status quo to distinguish between acts of commission and omission,
and between generous and greedy acts. But what does it take for a choice to
become generally recognized as the status quo? What if an act has benecial
short run impact but is harmful in the long run? Answers to these and other
questions await further theoretical development.
Appendix A. Mathematical proofs and derivations
A.1. Relative income sensitivity and homothetic preferences.
Lemma A.1. Preferences are homothetic on <2+ i¤ WTP is constant along
every ray Rd = f(t; td) : t > 0g  <2+:
Proof. By denition, preferences are homothetic i¤ they can be represented by a
utility function u(m; y) whose ratio of partial derivatives um=uy depends only on
the ratio m=y, not on m and y separately (see Simon and Blume, p. 503). But
the ratio d = m=y is constant on the ray Rd by construction. 
A.2. Curvature Formula. For a curve in the plane, curvature at a point has
absolute value jK j = 1=r, where r is the radius of the circle that is second-
order tangent to the curve at the given point. Intuitively, curvature of a curve
is the rate at which the curve turns and formally it is given by the derivative
of the curves tangential angle, i.e. K = d'=ds where tan' =  dy=dm and
ds =
p
dm2 + dy2. Substituting for ds, and inserting  dy=dm = MRS and
d' = d(MRS)=(1 +MRS2), one has
(A.1) K =
d(MRS)
(1 +MRS2)
p
dm2 + dy2
=
1p
1 +MRS2
3
d(MRS)
dm
See e.g., Gray, 1997, p. 14-17. If the indi¤erence curve is given implicitly by
u(m; y) = 0 then MRS = um=uy, hence
d(MRS)
dm
=
(umm + umydy=dm)uy   (uym + uyydy=dm)um
u2y
=
(umm   umyum=uy)uy   (uym   uyyum=uy)um
u2y
=
ummuy   2umyumuy + uyyu2m
u3y
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and therefore
K =
ummu
2
y   2umyumuy + uyyu2m
(u2m + u
2
y)
3=2
:
A.3. MAT is a partial ordering.
Proof. Properties of reexivity and transitivity are straightforward whereas the
antisymmetry property follows from Hicks Lemma (Hicks, 1939, Appendix): if
preferences have the sameMRS everywhere in D then they are the same. 
A.4. Relative curvature and homothetic preferences.
Lemma A.2. If preferences are homothetic then mK(m; dm) is constant along
the ray Rd.
Proof. It is well known that homothetic preferences can be represented by a utility
function u(m; y) that is homogenous of degree 1, and that rst (second) partial
derivatives of homogeneous functions of degree 1 are homogeneous of degree 0
(-1) (e.g. Varian, 1992, p. 482). It then follows directly from equation (2.1) that
mK (m;md) = K (1; d), 8m > 0. 
A.5. Stackelberg Followers opportunity set. NTP and Curvature.
The Followers opportunity set F (q
L
) has Eastern boundary S(q
L
) = f(m; y) :
m = Mq
F
; y = Mq
L
; q
F
2 [0; 24   q
L
]g where M = 24   qL   qF : Along this
boundary NTP and curvature K (as in A.1) are given by
NTP =  dm=dqF
dy=dqF
=
24  q
L
  2q
F
q
L
;
K =
1p
1 +MRT 2
3
d(MRT )
dm
=
1p
1 + q2L=(24  qL   2qF )2
3
d(qL=(24  qL   2qF ))
dqF
dqF
dm
=
2qL p
(24  q
L
  2q
F
)2 + q2
L
)
3 :
Note that NTP varies smoothly from positive to negative values as increasing
q
F
passes through qo
F
= 12  q
L
=2, the selsh best response. At corners (0; 0) and
(0; (24  q
L
)q
L
) curvature is not dened.
A.6. MGT is a partial ordering.
Proof. First note that
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(1) (m)   m is a (weakly) positive increasing function of m: This follows
from (m) = (0) + 0(z)m  m; for some z 2 [0;m]; and ((m) m)0 =
0(m)  1  0:
(2) #(z)  (z) for all z; by denition.
Now we verify the three properties of a partial order.
: reexivity, F MGT F . Simply take (z) = #(z) = z:
: transitivity, GMGT F and H MGT G implies H MGT F: By deniton
of MGT for C = H;G there exist TC : (m; y) 7 ! (c(m); #c(y)) such
that c(0)  0, 0c(m)  1, #c(z)  c(z) for all z; and G = TGF;
H = THG: Take T = TH  TG : <2+ 7 ! <2+ such that (m; y) 7 ! (H 
G(m); #H  #G(y)): Verify that T has properties required in Denition 2:
H = THG = THTGF and 0(m)  1 are straightforward. Now #(z) =
#H  #G(z)  H  #G(z)  H  G(z) = (z) follows from (2) and
monotonicity of H : Finally (0) = H  G(0)  G(0)  0; by (1) and
H(0)  0:
: antisymmetry, G MGT F and F MGT G implies F = G: By denition
of MGT there exist transformations T = (; #) and T = (; #) such
that G = TF and F = TG. Let mC = supfm : 9y s:t: (m; y) 2 Cg be
the largest feasible own income in C = F;G. Note that G MGT F and
the denition of mG imply mF  (mF )  mG; while F MGT G and
the denition of mF imply mG  (mG)  mF : Hence mF = mG: Using
the denition of mC we conclude that (mC)   mC = 0 for C = F;G.
Statement (1) now tells us that (m) = m = (m); for all m 2 [0;mC ]:
Statement (2) shows that in fact T maps an arbitrary point (m; y) 2 F
into the point (m;#(y)) 2 G with #(y)  y whereas T maps some point
(m; z) 2 G into the point (m; y) with y = #(z)  z: Convexity of G
implies (m; y) 2 G; and therefore F  G: Likewise for G  F:

A.7. Examples of MGT-ordered Opportunity Sets.
Opportunity sets in the Investment game are MGT ordered by s: We
show that F (s) MGT F (s) for all s > s  0:
Proof. Recall that @EFs = f(m; y) : m = I+ks  r; y = I s+ r; r 2 [0; ks]g. Let
; # : <+  ! <+; (m) = (m   I)s=s + I; if m  I; and (m) = m; if m < I;
and #(y) = (y  I)s=s+ I: It can be easily veried that 0(m)  1; (0) = 0 and
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(z)  #(z), for all z: So T : (m; y) 7 ! ((m); #(y)) has the denitive properties
in Denition 2.9
To verify that Fs = TFs, take an arbitrary point P = (P1; P2) 2 T@EFs. Then
P1 = (I + ks   r) = (ks   r)s=s + I; P2 = #(I   s + r) = ( s + r)s=s + I
for some r 2 [0; ks]: Note that r = s
s
r 2 [0; ks] i¤ r 2 [0; ks] and that
P1 + P2 = (k   1)s + 2I: Hence, T maps @EFs to @EFs. Recall that all other
points in Fs are of the form (aP1; P2), for some a 2 [0; 1]. Since (0) = 0 and 
is continuous and increasing, we see that T is well-behaved everywhere, indeed
mapping Fs onto Fs. 
Opportunity sets in the Stackelberg duopoly game are MGT ordered
by q
L
: We show that F (q
L
) MGT F (q
L
) for all q
L
> q
L
 0:
Proof. Given q
L
> q
L
dene ; # : <+  ! <+ by
(t) =

24  q
L
24  q
L
2
t; #(t) =
 
24  q
L

q
L
(24  q
L
) q
L
t
and verify that (0) = 0; 0(t) = [
 
24  q
L

=(24   q
L
)]2 > 1 and #(z)  (z),
for all z. Transformation T : <2+ ! <2+ s. t. (m; y) 7 ! ((m); #(y)) has all
properties required for T in Denition 2. Hence to complete the proof all we
need to show is that TF (q
L
) = F (q
L
): As in the previous proof, it su¢ cies to
show that T@F (q
L
) = @F (q
L
). Let P be an arbitrary point from T@F (q
L
): This
implies 9q
F
2 [0; 24  q
L
] s.t.
P1 = (MqF ) =

24  q
L
24  q
L
2
MqF ;P2 = #(MqL) =
 
24  q
L

q
L
(24  q
L
) q
L
Mq
L
Write P1 and P2 as
P1 =

24  q
L
  24  q

L
24  q
L
q
F

24  q
L
24  q
L
q
F
=MqF ;
P2 =

24  q
L
  24  q

L
24  q
L
q
F

q
L
=Mq
L
where qF = qF (24  qL)=(24  qL) and M = 24  qL   qF : It can be veried that
qF as just dened is from [0; 24   qL ] i¤ qF 2 [0; 24   qL ]; hence P 2 @F (qL):
Similarly for T@F (q
L
)  @F (q
L
). 
9Smoothness fails along the line (m; y) = (I; y). This can be patched either by relaxing the
denition slightly to require that the transformation be smooth almost everywhere and contin-
uous, or alternatively by smoothing the transformation used here using a standard partition of
unity construction, as in Rudin (1966, p. 40).
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A.8. Proposition 1. Suppose that either preferences A or the opportunity set
F are strictly convex, and let X be the A chosen point in F: Then X 2 @EF .
Proof. Suppose that X = (m; y) =2 @EF . Then by denition of @EF there exists
z > m such that M = (z; y) 2 F . Positive monotonicity in own payo¤ implies
that M is strictly preferred to X, contradicting the hypothesis that X is the
A-preferred point in F . 
A.9. Proposition 2. Theoretical predictions for xed opportunity set.
Suppose that either preferences A and B, or the opportunity set F , are strictly
convex. Let XA and XB be the points in F chosen when preferences are respec-
tively A and B. Then
(1) B MAT A implies dXB  dXA for homothetic preferences.
(2) If X 2 @EF lies on a ray with slope between dXA and dXB , then there
are preferences P with B MAT P MAT A such that X is the P-chosen
point in F:
(3) There are admissible preferences for which the chosen point is arbitrarily
close to SF , and other admissible preferences for which the chosen point
is arbitrarily close to NF .
Proof. First, recall that for homothetic preferences (i.e. WTP is constant on a
ray) strict convexity is equivalent withWTP decreasing as d increases. Formally,
for preferences J , 8Y; Z 2 @EF; dY < dZ i¤
(A.2) WTPJ (Y ) >WTPJ (Z)
Recall as well that along @EF; NTP increases as d increases (by convexity of F:)
Part 1. Suppose that B MAT A. This and optimality of XA imply
NTP(XA) =WTPA(XA) WTPB(XA)
Since all points from F in lower rays than XA have larger WTP (see (A.2))
and not smaller NTP (by convexity of F) than XA none of them is among the
B preferred point. Hence, dXB  dXA :
Part 2. Let X be given such that dXa < dX < dXb. Let wa and wb denote
continuous WTP functions for A and B preferences. If wb(X) = wa(X) then
X is the chosen point for both A and B preferences. If wb(X) > wa(X) then
consider some preferences P such that, for all Y , wp(Y ) = kwb(Y )+(1 k)wa(Y )
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where
k =
NTP(X)  wa(X)
wb(X)  wa(X) :
There exists a utility function withwP (Y ) since the latter is continuous (Hurewicz,
1958, p. 7-10; see also Hurwicz and Uzawa, 1971). Let P denote preferences being
represented by this utility function. B MAT P MAT A follows from k between
0 and 1 (implied by dXa < dX < dXb): X is P-chosen since straightforwardly,
wP (X) = NTP(X):
Part 3. Linear preferences with w going to  1 (+1) have the chosen point
arbitrarily close to SF (NF ): 
A.10. Proposition 3. Theoretical predictions for di¤erent opportunity
set. Let an agent with strictly convex and homothetic preferences A choose X
and W from some opportunity sets F and G; respectively. Let Y = tX 2 @G be
the most distant point from the origin on the ray through X in the opportunity
set G, and let Z 2 @EG solve NTP@F (X) = NTP@G(Z). Then, for preferences
A;
(1) if X 2 G then W 2 F c or W = X;
(2) dW  dX i¤ NTP@F (X)  NTP@G(Y ), and
(3) dW  dZ i¤ dZ  dX .
Proof. Suppose that X is a regular point from @EF: Then x = NTP(X) is
unique. Let the NTP of points from @EG take values between [; 
]: Z is: NF ;
if NTP(X) > ; SF ; if NTP(X) < ; otherwise Z is the point of @EG with
x 2 NTP(Z). Such a point exists by the Intermediate Value Theorem and is
unique because G is convex. If X is not a regular point then NTP(X) takes
values from some [; 
]: Make the arbitary convention that x =  and proceed
as with a regular point.
Part 1. Follows from standard revealed preference theory e.g., Varian (1992)
p. 131-133.
Part 2. dW  dX is equivalent with (a) NTP@G(Y )  NTP@G(W ) by convex-
ity of G and construction of Y ; and (b) WTP(W ) WTP(Y ) from (A.2). On
the other hand, by construction of Y and homotheticity (c)WTP(Y) =WTP(X),
and (d) WTP(X) = NTP@F (X); NTP@G(W ) =WTP(W ) since X;W are the
most preferred points in respectively, F;G: NTP@G(Y )  NTP@F (X) follows
from (a)-(d) and transitivity.
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Part 3. dW > dZ i¤ dZ < dX : Referring to (A.2), WTP(Y ) <WTP(Z) i¤
(dX =)dy > dZ and
WTP(Y ) =WTP(X) = NTP@F (X) = NTP@G(Z)  NTP@G(W )
=WTP(W ) <WTP(Z)
where the rst and the third equalities are true by construction of Y and Z, the
second and the fourth equalities follow from the optimality of X andW , whereas
the rst and the last inequalities are, for convex opportunity sets and preferences,
equivalent with dW > dZ : 
A.11. Proposition 4. Investment Game. Let the FM in the Investment game
choose Fs as the SMs opportunity set, and let r(s) be the SMs response. Also
let the same SM be given the same opportunity set Fs in a dictator game, and let
ro(s) be his response there. Assume that WTP  1 and WTPm  0: Then:
(1) convexity implies that ro(s) is increasing in s;
(2) Axiom R implies that r(s) is increasing in s;
(3) Axiom S implies that r(s)  ro(s) for s = 0; 1; 2; :::; 10.
Proof. Part 1. To streamline notation, let w = WTP(m; y), where m = 10 +
3s   r(s) and y = 10   s + r(s): By hypothesis, w  1 and (a) wm  0: By
Lemma A.3 below, strict convexity implies that wmw   wy > 0. It follows that
(b) wm wy > 0. SinceNTP = 1, a constant, along the Eastern boundary of any
opportunity set determined by s, the rst order condition for optimality requires
w also to remain constant. Therefore
0 =
dw
ds
= wm
dm
ds
+ wy
dy
ds
= [(3  dr=ds)wm + ( 1 + dr=ds)wy]
= 2[wm] + (1  dr=ds) [wm   wy] :
The bracketed expressions are positive by (a) and (b) above, so we must have
dr=ds > 1 for choices not at the corner. For corner choices and weak convexity,
the argument allows only to conclude that r(s) is nondecreasing.
Part 2. Applying Axiom R in the argument above, we see that it increases
dr=ds; so the preceding argument holds a fortiori.
Part 3. Axiom S has the indicated impact since, as shown in the previous
subsection, Fs isMGT ordered by s. 
Lemma A.3. Strict convexity implies that wmw   wy > 0:
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Proof. Recall that K < 0. We claim that
K =
(wy   wmw)
(1 + w2)3=2
;
from which the lemma follows immediately. To verify the claim, simply substitute
w =
uy
um
; wm =
uymum   ummuy
u2m
; wy =
uyyum   umyuy
u2m
into the above expression for K and recover equation (2.1). 
A.12. Proposition 5. Stackelberg Duopoly Game. In the standard Stackel-
berg game of Example 3.9 let QD(qL) = qF  qoF be the deviation of the Followers
output choice qF from the selsh best reply qoF = 12  12qL when the Leader chooses
output qL. One has
dQD
dqL
=  1
2
w   dw
dqL
qL
where w = WTP (MqF ;MqL) is willingness to pay at the chosen point. Further-
more,
(1) If Followers preferences A are xed and linear, then w is constant with
respect to qL and
dQD
dqL
is positive if and only if preferences at the chosen
point are malevolent.
(2) If Followers preferences A are xed and convex, then w is decreasing
in qL and
dQD
dqL
contains an additional term that is positive provided that
qL  12, w  1, wm  0 and wm + wy  0.
(3) If Followers preferences satisfy Axiom R strictly, then w is decreasing in
qL and
dQrD
dqL
contains an additional positive term.
(4) If Followers preferences satisfy Axiom S strictly, then WTP is decreasing
in qL and
dQsD
dqL
has an additional positive (negative) term if the status quo
is smaller (larger) than qL:
Proof. The FOC can be written as w(qF ; qL)  WTP(MqF ;MqL) = NTP =
24 2qF
qL
  1, which can be rewritten as
(A.3) qF = 12  w(qF ; qL) + 1
2
qL:
Inserting the denition of QD from the statement of the proposition, we obtain
(A.4) QD =  w(qF ; qL)
2
qL:
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Part 1. Linear preferences If Followers preferences are xed and linear with
WTP = w then di¤erentiation of (A.4) with respect to qL gives
dQD
dqL
=  w
2
:
Part 2. Convex Preferences If Followers preferences are xed and convex then
dQD
dqL
=  w(qF ; qL)
2
  qL
2
dw(qF ; qL)
dqL
:
The additional (second) term above is positive because, as we now will verify,
dw(qF ;qL)
dqL
is negative. Indeed,
dw(qF ; qL)
dqL
= wm
dm
dqL
+ wy
dy
dqL
= wm(( 1  dqF
dqL
)qF +M
dqF
dqL
) + wy(( 1  dqF
dqL
)qL +M)
which after substituting M = 24   qL   qF ; qF = 12   w(qF ;qL)+12 qL and dqFdqL =
 w(qF ;qL)+1
2
  dw(qF ;qL)
dqL
qL and solving for
dw(qF ;qL)
dqL
we get
dw(qF ; qL)
dqL
=
B
A
where
A = 2 + [wmw   wy] q2L > 0
by Lemma (A.3), and
B = 24(wy   wm) + qL(1  w)(wm   wy + wwm   wy):
To sign B, recall that as in the proof of the previous proposition and Lemma
(A.3), wy wm  0 due to convexity, w  1 and wm  0. Suppose qL  12: Then
2qL  24 and wy   wm  0 imply
B <    w2wm   2wwy + wm qL:
If w 2 [0; 1] then the expression in brackets is non-negative (write it as w(wwm 
wy + wm=w   wy) which is larger than 2w(wwm   wy)  0). If however w < 0
then the term in brackets is positive since w2y   w2m  0. To see this, recall that
wy + wm  0 and wy   wm  0: Hence B is negative and the additional term is
indeed positive.
Part 3. AxiomR E¤ect. Let wr(qF ; qL) denoteWTP for changed preferences
as in Axiom R: Then
QrD =  
wr(qF ; qL)
2
qL
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for all qL; and
dQrD
dqL
=  w
r(qF ; qL)
2
  qL
2
dwr(qF ; qL)
dqL
=  w(qF ; qL)
2
  w
r(qF ; qL)  w(qF ; qL)
2
  qL
2
dwr(qF ; qL)
dqL
:
From Axiom R the second term is positive and similarly as in part 2 the third
term is positive if induced preferences are benevolent (wr  0) or malevolent with
wry + w
r
m  0.
Part 4. Axiom S E¤ect. Let ws(qF ; qL) denoteWTP for changed preferences
as in Axiom S. Then
QcD =  
ws(qF ; qL)
2
qL
is smaller (larger) than QrD if the status quo is smaller (larger) than qL, and
dQsD
dqL
=  w
s(qF ; qL)
2
  qL
2
dws(qF ; qL)
dqL
has an additional positive (negative) term if the status quo is smaller (larger)
than qL: 
A.13. Corollary 1. Stackelberg Mini-Game. For 0 < x < s < z < 24; sup-
pose the Stackelberg Leader has restricted output choices q
L
2 fx; sg in situation
(a) and q
L
2 fz; sg in another situation (b). Let the Leader choose s in both sit-
uations. If Followers preferences satisfy Axioms R and S then QaD(s)  QbD(s);
and at each possible Follower choice qF ;WTPa(MqF ;Ms) WTPb(MqF ;Ms):
Proof. In situation (a) induced preferences AaFs are AaF cs or AaF s depending on
whether output x is considered as status quo by the Follower. Axiom S implies
AaF os MAT AaF cs and AaF os MAT AaF s . Similarly, in situation (b) Axiom S implies
AbF cs MAT AF os and AbF s MAT AF os : By transitivity AbFs MAT AaFs : Then the
the last inequality is straightforward by denition of MAT whereas for the rst
one recall that: (i) qoF stays constant (it depends only on s), and NTP along @Fs
decreases as qF increases. 
A.14. Alternative Regressions. The last proof suggests alternative speci-
cations for the HMN regressions. Let a = wmw   wy, b = wy   wm and
c = (1   w) (wm   wy + wwm   wy) : Recall from the proof that a  0; b  0
32 BY JAMES C. COX, DANIEL FRIEDMAN, AND VJOLLCA SADIRAJ
and c  0 for all qL , and
dw(qF ; qL)
dqL
=
24b
2 + aq2L
+
c
2 + aq2L
qL;
dQD
dqL
=  w(qF ; qL)
2
  12b
2 + aq2L
qL   c
2(2 + aq2L)
q2L:
The rst order Taylor expansion QD(qL)  C+ dQDdqL qL then suggests tting QD
to a cubic expression in qL,
QD = 0 + 1qL + 2q
2
L + 3q
3
L + ui + "i:
The predicted coe¢ cient signs then are 2 > 0; 3 < 0; consistent with the results
reported in Table 3 below. Likewise, dw
dqL
 1 + 2qL suggests the quadratic
specicationWTP = 0 + 1qL + 2q
2
L + ui + "i: The predictions 2 > 0; 1 <
0 are consistent with the results but are not signicant in this specication.
Allowing asymmetric responses to Leader choices more or less generous than
Cournot produces more signicant estimates, as reported in the last column.
Dep:V ariable QD WTP 100 WTP 100
qL  2:13 0:930:013  6:07 5:240:124  3:98 5:190:222
DP  qL 2:62 0:920:003
q2L 0:29 0:110:005 0:08 0:270:385 0:09 0:260:365
q3L  0:01 0:0040:005
constant 4:41 2:630:048 28:26 24:870:129 0:39 26:290:494
Table 3. Panel Regressions with xed e¤ects. Data consist of 220
choices by 22 Followers in HMN experiment. One-sided p-values
are reported and  refers to standard error.
Appendix B. Instructions
Welcome
This is an experiment about decision-making. You will be paid a $5 participation
fee plus an additional positive or zero amount of money determined by the de-
cisions that you and the other participants make, as explained below. Payment
is in cash at the end of the experiment. A research foundation has provided the
funds for this experiment.
No Talking Allowed
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Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have
a question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and
answer your question in private.
A Monitor and Two Groups
A monitor will be selected randomly from among those of you who came here
today. The rest of you have been divided randomly into two groups, called the
First Mover Group and the Second Mover Group.
Complete Privacy
The experiment is structured so that no one  not even the experimenters,
the monitor, and the other subjects  will ever know your personal decision
in the experiment. You collect your cash payment from a sta¤ person in the
Economics Department o¢ ce who has no other role in the experiment. Your
payment is in a sealed envelope with a code letter (A, B, C, etc). Your privacy is
guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear
on any decision records. The only identifying mark on the decision forms will be a
code letter known only to you. You will show your code letter to the sta¤ person
and nobody else will see it. The experimenters will not be in the department
o¢ ce when you collect you cash payment. This procedure is used to protect your
privacy.
The Idea of the Game
The game involves two players, called the First Mover (FM) and the Second
Mover (SM), in the roles of producers of an identical good. Each decides how
much to produce. The prot for each player is the number of units he decides
to produce times price, net of cost. The price of the good decreases as total
production increases. If you and the other player produce too much, you will
drive down the price and your prots. Of course, if you dont produce much you
wont have many units to sell.
To simplify your task, the prots will be calculated for you and shown in an easy-
to-read table. Your cash payment will include the prot you earn in one round
of the game. The round will be selected randomly at the end of the experiment.
Game Details
Each round the FM chooses between two possible amounts to produce, as shown
in a table with two rows. The SM sees the choice of the FM, and then decides
among seven possible amounts to produce, as shown in seven columns of the same
table. The table shows the prots for both players. The FMs prot is shown
in italics in the lower left corner of each box, and the SMs prot is shown in
bold in the upper right corner. For example, in Table B.1 below, if FM chooses
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Output=6 and SM then chooses Output=4, then FMs prot is 84 and SMs
prot is 56.
Table B.1
j SMs Choice of Output Quantity:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
FMs Output=6 84 56 78 65 72 72 66 77 60 80 54 81 48 80 42 77
FMs Output=9 99 44 90 50 81 54 72 56 63 56 54 54 45 50 36 44
Di¤erent Subject Pairs in Every Decision
Each First Mover and each Second Mover will make four decisions. But the
pairing of First Movers with Second Movers will be di¤erent in every decision.
This means that you will interact with a DIFFERENT person in the other group
in every decision that you make.
Experiment Procedures and the Monitor
At the beginning of the experiment, the monitor will walk through the room
carrying a box containing unmarked, large manila envelopes. Each subject in the
First Mover Group will take one of these envelopes from the box. This envelope
will contain the experiment decision forms and a code letter.
After the First Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment
decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front of the
room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important that
the First Movers do NOT return their code letters to the large manila envelopes,
because they will need them to collect their payo¤s.
After all First Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor will
take the box to another room in which the experimenters will sort the decision
forms and place them in the correct large manila envelopes for the Second Movers.
The experimenters will also put code letters in the envelopes for the Second
Movers.
Next, the Monitor will walk through the room carrying a box containing un-
marked, large manila envelopes. Each subject in the Second Mover Group will
take one of these envelopes from the box. This envelope will contain the experi-
ment decision forms and a code letter.
After the Second Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment
decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front of the
room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important
that the Second Movers do NOT return their code letters in the large manila
envelopes because they will need them to collect their payo¤s.
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After all Second Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor
will take the box to another room in which the experimenters will record the
prots and cash payments determined by the subjectsdecisions.
A Roll of a Die Determines Which Decision Pays Money
Although you will make four decisions, only one will pay cash. Which of these
decisions will pay cash will be determined by rolling a six-sided die. The exper-
imenter will roll the die in front of you and the monitor will announce which of
the numbered sides has ended up on top. The rst number from 1 to 4 that ends
up on top will determine the page number of the decision that pays cash.
The monitors cash payment will be the average of all First Movers and Second
Movers payments.
Be Careful
Be careful in recording your decisions. If a First Mover forgets to circle one of
the rows in the table, or circles both rows on the same decision page, then it will
be impossible to ascertain what decision the First Mover made. In that case, the
First Mover will get paid 0 and the Second Mover will get paid 60 if that decision
page is selected for payo¤ by the roll of the die. If a Second Mover doesnt circle
a column, then it will be impossible to ascertain what decision the Second Mover
made. In that case, the Second Mover will get paid 0 and the First Mover will
get paid 60 if that decision page is selected for payo¤ by the roll of the die.
Pay Rates
For each point of prot you earn, the experimenter will put a xed number of
dollars in your envelope. This xed number is called the pay rate and is written
on the board at the front of the room. Todays pay rate is $0.25, which means
that every participant earns 25 cents for each prot point shown in the table.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q1: Exactly how are prots calculated in the Tables?
A: Price is 30 minus the sum of FM output and SM output. Marginal cost is 6.
Prot is output times (price minus marginal cost). But you dont have to worry
about doing the calculation; the Tables do it for you.
Q2: Who will know what decisions I make?
A: Nobody else besides you; that is the point of the private envelopes etc. The
experimenters are only interested in knowing the distribution of choices for FMs
and SMs, not in the private decisions of individual participants.
Q3: Is this some psychology experiment with an agenda you havent told us?
A: No. It is an economics experiment. If we do anything deceptive, or dont pay
you cash as described, then you can complain to the campus Human Subjects
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Committee and we will be in serious trouble. These instructions are on the level
and our interest is in seeing the distribution of choices made in complete privacy.
Any More Questions?
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will ap-
proach you and answer your question in private. Make sure that you understand
the instructions before beginning the experiment; otherwise you could, by mis-
take, mark a di¤erent decision than you intended.
Quiz
(1) In Table B.2 below, what are the two possible output choices for the FM?
__
(2) Does the SM see the FMs choice? (Y or N)
(3) In Table B.2, can the SM choose:
(a) Output=5? __(Y or N)
(b) Output =7?__(Y or N)
(c) Output=12?__(Y or N)
(4) Suppose the FM chooses the top row (Output = 9) in Table B.2 and the
SM chooses a middle column (Output = 8).
(a) How many points will the FM get? __ points
(b) How much money is that if this is the decision that pays money?
$ __
(c) How much will the SM get in this case? __ points, $ __
(5) In the previous question, if SM chose Output=9 instead of Output=8,
(a) how many more or fewer points would the SM get?
__ more/fewer points
(b) how many more or fewer points would the FM get?
__ more/fewer points
(6) If the FM chooses the top row, what is the maximum number of points
that the SM can get? __ the minimum number?__
(7) If the FM chooses the bottom row, what is the maximum number of points
that the SM can get? __ the minimum number?
(8) Will the SM ever be able to tell which person made any FM choice?
(Y or N)
(9) Will the FM ever be able to tell which person made any SM choice?
(Y or N)
(10) Will the experimenter ever be able to tell who made any choices?
(Y or N)
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Table B.2
j SMs Choice of Output Quantity:
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
FMs Output=9 99 44 90 50 81 54 72 56 63 56 54 54 45 50 36 44
FMs Output=12 96 32 84 35 72 36 60 35 48 32 36 27 24 20 12 11
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Figure 3. Power to Take Game, Second Movers Opportunity Set.
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Figure 4. Investment Game, Second Movers Opportunity Set.
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Figure 5. Moonlighting Game, Second Movers Opportunity Set.
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Figure 6. Gift Exchange Labor Markets, Second Movers Oppor-
tunity Set.
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Figure 7. Sequential VCM Public Goods Game with two players (a=0.75).
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Figure 8. Stackelberg Duopoly Game, Followers Opportunity Set.
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Figure 9. Illustration of Example 5.1.
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Figure 10. Proposition 3 predicts that, with unchanged homo-
thetic preferences, the choice W will lie on the Eastern boundary
of opportunity setG between points Y and Z. The prediction (Part
(1) of the proposition) is that W is north of point P on @EG:
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Figure 11. Data from Stackelberg mini-game. Deviations QD of
SM actual output choice from the selsh best response are shown
in four situations. From left to right, the situations are: FM chose
qL = 6 from f6; 9g, FM chose qL = 9 from f9; 12g, FM chose qL = 9
from f6; 9g, and FM chose qL = 12 from f9; 12g. The size of the dot
reects the fraction of observations in each situation. The number
of observations is shown next to each dot.
